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Abstract
Despite the decline in group inequality and the rapid expansion of the black middle
class in the United States, major urban centers with signiﬁcant black populations
continue to exhibit extreme levels of racial separation. Using a theoretical framework
in which individuals care both about the level of aﬄuence and the racial composition of
their communities, we show that no monotonic relationship exists between narrowing
racial income disparities and segregation even when all households prefer somewhat
integrated communities to segregated ones. Low racial inequality is consistent with
extreme and even rising levels of segregation in cities where the minority population
is large. Our results can help explain why racial segregration continues to characterize
the urban landscape in the United States even though survey evidence suggests that
all groups favor more integration than they did in the past.
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Several decades have elapsed since the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed discrim-
ination in employment and public education, and the 1968 Fair Housing Act extended these
protections to the sale and rent of housing. Over this period racial disparities in educational
attainment and household income have narrowed, and a signiﬁcant population of middle
class African Americans has emerged. Approximately one-half of black Americans now live
in middle or upper income households as compared with about one-ﬁfth in 1960. The black-
white gap in high school completion rates for 25-29 year-olds dropped from 20 percentage
points in 1967 to 7 points in 1996. Median black household income rose by 41% between
1967 and 1999 while the median white household income rose by 24% over the same period
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2000, Council of Economic Advisors, 1998).1
Despite the decline in group inequality and the rapid expansion of the black middle
class, residential segregation remains a striking feature of the urban landscape in many large
metropolitan areas with signiﬁcant black populations. Major urban centers such as New
York, Chicago, Detroit, Newark and Milwaukee continue to be characterized by extreme
levels of racial separation, even as areas with smaller black populations have begun to show
signs of greater integration. Moreover, the levels of segregation experienced by black house-
holds are uniformly high across all income categories, and the relative segregation of diﬀerent
cities has remained remarkably stable for over a century.2
The easiest way to reconcile the narrowing racial income gap with persistent segregation
is to argue that households prefer more segregated neighborhoods than they did in the past.
If racial identities have hardened and the racial composition of a neighborhood has become
more important than its wealth in determining residential location, the eﬀects of black income
gains may be more than oﬀset by these changes in preferences. Survey evidence, however,
suggests quite the opposite: attitudes of white Americans towards integrated schools and
neighborhoods seem have softened considerably. In a recent review of the literature, Bobo
(2001, p.269) maintains that the “single clearest trend shown in studies of racial attitudes
has involved a steady and sweeping movement toward general endorsement of the principles
1The extent of convergence in the racial wage gap is not uncontroversial. Chandra (2003) points out that
estimates based on the Current Population Survey may be ﬂawed since they do not account for the selective
non-participation of blacks in the labor force. He argues that as much as 85% of the observed convergence in
earnings may be accounted for by selection problems caused largely by the relatively high black incarceration
rates. While this may be true, it is mainly the non-incarcerated who make decisions on residential location,
and it is the racial income convergence for this group which is of relevance here.
2See Denton and Massey (1988), Massey and Denton (1993), Farley and Frey (1994), and Cutler et al.
(1999) for evidence and interpretations, and Glaeser and Vigdor (2001) and Lewis Mumford Center (2001)
for an analysis of the most recent data.
2of racial equality and integration.” For instance, in 1963 only 39% of white respondents
disagreed with the statement that whites had a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhood;
by 1996 this had risen to 86% (Schuman et al., 1997).3 What, then, accounts for the
continuing hypersegregation of major metropolitan areas with signiﬁcant black populations?
We show in this paper that narrowing racial income disparities can, under certain cir-
cumstances, result in increasing residential segregation in cities with signiﬁcant black pop-
ulations. This can happen even when all households have a strong preference for integrated
over segregated neighborhoods. Hence the intuitive and widely-held view that declining seg-
regation is a natural consequence of reductions in group inequality is not supported by our
analysis. The conventional view is rooted in the intuition that if households sort themselves
across neighborhoods on the basis of income, then racial income disparities will be mirrored
in segregated residential patterns. This intuition fails when households make location deci-
sions based on multiple neighborhood characteristics. When individuals care also about the
racial composition of their communities, the relationship between inequality and segregation
is more complex and depends in subtle ways on both intraracial and interracial disparities
in income.
Our analysis is conducted within the framework of a model in which incomes vary both
within and between groups, and individuals care about both the level of aﬄuence and the
racial composition of the communities in which they reside. This concern with racial com-
position may be pro-integrationist, in that households prefer some degree of mixing to ho-
mogenous neighborhoods of either type. Individuals are able to locate in any neighborhood,
provided that they are willing and able to outbid others to do so.4 We focus on equilibrium
allocations that are stable in the sense that small perturbations in the neighborhood of the
equilibrium are self-correcting under the dynamics of decentralized neighborhood choice.
We present two main results. The ﬁrst of these demonstrates that when the share of mi-
nority households is substantial, extreme levels of segregation can be stable if racial income
disparities are either suﬃciently large or small, but unstable in some intermediate range.
Hence racially integrated equilibria are most likely to be observed for moderate degrees of
racial inequality. Continued narrowing of racial income disparities can give rise to resegrega-
tion and, from a cross-sectional perspective, one ought not to expect cities with the smallest
racial income disparities to be the ones with the lowest levels of segregation. The relationship
between inequality and segregation that is suggested by our analysis helps account for the
3Additional evidence on attitudes is discussed in Section 2 below.
4This may not be possible in practice due to racial steering by real estate agents or discrimination in
mortgage lending markets (Yinger, 1995). We abstract from such overt discrimination because its eﬀects on
segregation are reasonably well understood, and because doing so allows us to better focus on the questions
at hand.
3fact that income convergence has not typically been found to have statistically discernible
eﬀects on changes in segregation over time (Farley and Frey, 1994).
Our second result shows that when racial income disparities are small, multiple equilibria
exist, and these equilibria can diﬀer dramatically in their corresponding levels of segregation.
The existence of multiple equilibria suggests that although integration may become viable
as racial income disparities lessen, history may trap a city in a segregated equilibrium. This
is where social policy may be most eﬀective: temporary incentives for integration may give
rise to permanent eﬀects. Integration comes at the cost of higher stratiﬁcation by income,
however, so integrationist policies need not be unambiguously welfare enhancing even when
preferences are strongly pro-integrationist.
To obtain some intuition for our ﬁndings, consider ﬁrst the extreme case in which the
two income distributions are identical and the black minority is substantial. Under complete
segregation, households are faced with a choice between racially homogenous neighborhoods
of comparable mean income. Even if all households prefer some integration, segregation
will be stable as long as individuals prefer racially homogenous neighborhoods populated by
their own group to racially homogenous neighborhoods populated by other group. As income
disparities between groups widen, so do mean neighborhood incomes under segregation, and
at some point aﬄuent blacks will outbid the less aﬄuent whites to live in a higher income,
predominantly white neighborhood. At this point segregation becomes unstable. At the
other extreme, when income disparities are large, segregation by race is almost equivalent to
stratiﬁcation by income, and segregated allocations are again stable. Hence the relationship
between inequality and segregation is not monotonic. With small income disparities, the
allocation in which households sort themselves purely by income will be stable as long as
preferences for integration are strong enough. Since segregation is also stable under these
conditions, we have multiple equilibria.
Our work is closely related to two literatures which deal with the decentralized dynam-
ics of neighborhood choice. The idea that extreme levels of segregation can arise under a
broad range of preferences over neighborhood composition was developed in seminal work
by Schelling (1971, 1972). This analysis contains the important insight that even when all
individuals prefer integrated neighborhoods to segregated ones, integration may be unsus-
tainable in that a few random shocks can tip the system to a segregated equilibrium. It is
diﬃcult, therefore, to deduce anything about individual preferences from aggregate patterns
of residential location.5 While Schelling’s analysis neglects the role of prices in rationing
5“People who have to choose between polarized extremes ... will often choose in a way that reinforces the
polarization. Doing so is no evidence that they prefer segregation, only that, if segregation exists and they
have to choose between exclusive association, people elect like rather than unlike environments.” (Schelling,
4housing demand, broadly similar conclusions hold in models that take full account of adjust-
ments in rents (Yinger, 1976, Schnare and McRae, 1978, Kern, 1981). This literature neglects
the fact that individuals consider both race and income when making location choices, and
that forces acting to produce income stratiﬁcation can substantially mitigate the amount of
racial segregation that results. While extreme levels of segregation are consistent with pro-
integrationist preferences in our model, it is also the case that, under certain circumstances,
stable equilibria can entail greater integration than any individual, black or white, considers
ideal.
There is also an extensive literature on neighborhood sorting when individuals diﬀer with
respect to their incomes and sort themselves across jurisdictions on the basis of neighborhood
characteristics such as local taxation, redistribution, public education, or peer-eﬀects (De
Bartolome, 1990, Epple and Romer, 1991, Benabou, 1992, Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996,
Durlauf, 1996, Epple and Platt, 1998). Stratiﬁcation by income occurs in many such models.
What is missing from this body of work is the possibility that individualsc a r ea b o u tc e r t a i n
intrinsic characteristics of those with whom they share their neighborhoods, and that such
preferences are themselves related to group membership. When there is inequality both
within and between groups, adding these components to the analysis yields signiﬁcant new
insights that appear neither in the segregation literature descended from Schelling, nor in
the literature on neighborhood sorting in the Tiebout tradition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some discussion and justiﬁcation
for our key assumption that individuals care about both the racial composition and the level
of aﬄuence in their communities. The model is developed in Section 3, and its equilibrium
properties characterized in Section 4. Section 5 examines the relationship between racial
income disparities and residential segregation, and Section 6 concludes.
2P r e f e r e n c e s
Extensive survey evidence on the racial attitudes of Americans has been collected for more
than half a century. Several studies have speciﬁcally attempted to ascertain the preferences
of respondents over neighborhood racial composition (Farley et. al., 1978, 1993, Bobo et al.,
1986). The best recent evidence comes from a ‘Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality’ funded
jointly by the Ford Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation. Subjects drawn from the
Los Angeles and Boston metropolitan areas were asked to construct an “ideal neighborhood
that had the ethnic and racial mix” that the respondent “personally would feel most comfort-
able in”. They did so by examining a card depicting three rows of ﬁve houses each, imagining
1978, p.146).
5their own house to be at the center of the middle row, and assigning to each of remaining
houses an ethnic/racial category using the letters A (Asian), B (Black), W (White) and H
(Hispanic). The study found evidence that “all groups prefer both substantial numbers of
co-ethnic neighbors and considerable integration” (Zubrinsky Charles, 2001, p.257). On av-
erage, the ideal neighborhood consisted of a plurality of the respondent’s own type (ranging
from 40% for black respondents to 52% for whites) together with signiﬁcant representation
from other groups. Only 2.5% of blacks to 11.1% of whites considered homogeneous neigh-
borhoods populated only with their own type to be ideal. Overall, this reﬂects a clear desire
for some degree of integration on the part of all groups, with a bias towards members of one’s
own group. This is consistent with prior studies of attitudes towards racial composition and
motivates the speciﬁcation used in this paper.
Why might individuals care about the racial composition of their neighborhoods? As
noted by Cornell and Hartmann (1997, pp. 23-24), “race still wields monumental power as a
social category” despite the fact that “racial categories are historical products that are often
contested.” Farley et al. (1994) trace white attitudes to negative racial stereotypes, and black
attitudes to anticipated hostility from whites. Ellen (2000) argues that white households hold
an exaggerated view (relative to black households) of the association between changes in
racial composition and structural decline in neighborhood quality. Whites are consequently
less willing than blacks to settle in neighborhoods which have recently experienced increases
in the share of the black residents. O’Flaherty (1999) has argued that interracial transactions
of many kinds are rendered diﬃcult because the signals blacks and whites send each other
through their actions and words “are garbled by stereotypes and the possibility of animosity.”
The fact that communication is easier and less ambiguous when it does not cross racial lines
could account for a desire to live among one’s own group. Signals also play a key role in
the search-theoretic model of Lundberg and Startz (1998), where signals from members of
one’s own group are interpreted with less noise than signals from others. Again this can
lead endogenously to a desire to associate primarily with one’s own group. While we take
preferences over neighborhood racial composition to be exogenously given, our speciﬁcation
is consistent with these interpretations. In addition, we allow for the possibility that there
may be a preference for some degree of integration on the part of both blacks and whites, as
suggested by the survey evidence.
We assume that, in addition to neighborhood racial composition, individuals also care
about the level of aﬄuence in their communities. There are a number of reasons why this
m i g h tb et h ec a s e . T h eq u a l i t yo fp u b l i cs c h o o l si sl i a b l et ob eb e t t e ri nm o r ea ﬄuent
neighborhoods even if government per-pupil expenditures are uniform across the city. This
is because voluntary contributions to parent-teacher associations increase with income, and
6because human capital transfers that occur in the home have spillover eﬀects in school. The
presence of positive role models (and the absence of negative ones) is correlated with the
degree of aﬄuence of a community. Living an a more aﬄuent community provides entry into
social networks which can be lucrative. And if the external upkeep of one’s residence is a
normal good with positive external eﬀects, more aﬄuent communities will be more desirable.
Each of these eﬀects have been discussed extensively in the literature (Bond and Coulson,
1989, De Bartolome, 1990, and Benabou, 1992). Although the desire to live in a more
aﬄuent community can be endogenously derived on the basis of any of the above concerns,
it is treated here as a primitive of the model.
3 The Model
Consider a city with a continuum of households represented by the interval [0,1]. Households
diﬀer along two dimensions, income and race. There are two groups, black and white,
and the share of black households in the city is denoted β<1
2. Within each group the
income distribution is represented by absolutely continuous distribution functions Fb(y) and
Fw(y), with fb(y) and fw(y) denoting the corresponding densities. The supports of the two















,F b(y) >F w(y). Taken together,
these assumptions imply that whites are wealthier than blacks as a group, although the
wealthiest black households are better oﬀ than the poorest white ones. What distinguishes
blacks from whites in this model is simply the fact that the former are members of a socially
identiﬁable minority group with an income distribution that is dominated by that of the
majority group.
The city is divided into two disjoint neighborhoods of equal size.6 Any subset A ⊂ [0,1]
with measure one-half represents an allocation of households across neighborhoods, with
the interpretation that any household in A resides in neighborhood 1, while the remain-
ing households are in neighborhood 2. Any allocation of households across neighborhoods
uniquely determines both the racial composition and the distribution of income within each
neighborhood. Let ¯ yj denote the mean income in neighborhood j ∈ {1,2} and βj ∈ [0,2β]
the share of neighborhood j’s population that is black.
Housing units are identical, and rents are accordingly uniform within each neighborhood.
6Neither the assumption of equal size, nor the restriction to two neighborhoods is critical. These as-
sumptions considerably facilitate exposition and allow clearer statements of our results. Our main results
characterizing the relationship between racial income disparities and equilibrium segregation (Propositions
1-2) can be appropriately modiﬁed to hold also for multiple neighborhoods of unequal size.
7We normalize the rent in neighborhood 1 to equal zero and let ρ be the (possibly negative)
rent in neighborhood 2. All income not spent on rent is used for private consumption. Apart
from their private consumption, individuals care about the general aﬄuence and racial com-
position of their communities. Neighborhoods with higher mean incomes are more desirable
than those with lower mean incomes for all members of the population.7 Additionally, black
and white households diﬀer systematically with regard to their preferences over neighbor-
hood racial composition. We shall assume for simplicity that the preferences of blacks and
whites are symmetric in a sense to be made clear below. We do not assume, however, that
preferences are monotonic in neighborhood racial composition. In particular, we allow for
the possibility that households strictly prefer a wide range of integrated neighborhoods to
segregated ones, and that being part of a sizeable minority may be more attractive than
being part of an overwhelming majority.
Preferences are represented by the following utility function
U(c, ¯ y,r)=u(c, ¯ y)+v(r),
where c is private consumption, ¯ y is neighborhood mean income, and r is the neighborhood
population share of the individual’s own group. Hence r = β for black households and
r =1− β for whites. We assume that u(c, ¯ y) is diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in both
arguments, and satisﬁes u11 < 0 and u12 ≥ 0. These assumptions are standard in the
sorting literature and together imply that more aﬄuent households have a higher willingness
to pay for increases in mean neighborhood income. We assume that utility from the racial
composition of the neighborhood, v(r),i sd i ﬀerentiable and strictly concave, with a maximum





. Hence all households would ideally like some degree of racial integration,
which is consistent with the survey data. We assume further that v(1) >v (0), which implies
that when choosing between racially segregated neighborhoods, households prefer to the
one inhabited by their own group. This speciﬁcation is consistent with a variety of attitudes
towards neighborhood racial composition, including the possibility that all households prefer
being part of a sizeable minority to being in an overwhelming majority.
Equilibrium in this model is an allocation of households across neighborhoods and a rent
ρ such that no household prefers a neighborhood diﬀerent from its own. In other words,
equilibrium requires that for any household with income y who resides in neighborhood 1
i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tU(y,¯ y1,r 1) ≥ U(y − ρ, ¯ y2,r 2). The inequality is reversed for any
household in neighborhood 2. Note that the relevant argument in the utility function is the
share in the neighborhood of the individuals own group. We shall refer to an allocation
7All our results remain intact (with proofs essentially unchanged) if households care about median rather
than mean income.
8in which each neighborhood contains members of both races as integrated,a n da l lo t h e r
allocations as segregated.
We say that an allocation is intraracially stratiﬁed if there exist threshold income levels ˜ yb
and ˜ yw such that one neighborhood consists exclusively of all black households with income
above ˜ yb together with all white households with income above ˜ yw. The neighborhood with
this property shall be referred to as the upper-tail neighborhood. The other (lower-tail)
neighborhood then consists exclusively of all black households with income below ˜ yb together
with all white households with income below ˜ yw. Intraracial stratiﬁcation is consistent with
complete segregation (if F(˜ yb)=0or 1), with pure stratiﬁcation by income (if ˜ yb =˜ yw), and
a variety of other patterns of neighborhood sorting. Without loss of generality, we adopt
the convention that at any intraracially stratiﬁed allocation, neighborhood 2 is the upper-
tail neighborhood. A direct implication of the assumption that more aﬄuent households
have a higher willingness to pay to live in wealthier neighborhoods is that any equilibrium
allocation in which the higher income neighborhood has a higher rent must satisfy intraracial
stratiﬁcation.
When an allocation is intraracially stratiﬁed, the mean incomes and racial compositions
in each neighborhood can all be expressed as a function of the threshold income level for white
households. Let z =˜ yw denote the threshold income for whites. It must be the case that
z ∈ [zmin,z max] where zmin is deﬁned by the condition (1 − β)(1− Fw(zmin)) = 1
2, and zmax
by (1 − β)Fw(zmax)=1
2. When z = zmin the upper-tail neighborhood consists exclusively
of white households, and when z = zmax the lower-tail neighborhood is exclusively white.










The threshold ˜ yb(z) identiﬁes the unique level of black income such that the blacks with
income above this threshold and whites with income above z together constitute half the
population. Note that ˜ yb(z) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function on [zmin,z max].
At any intraracially stratiﬁed allocation z, the share of black households in neighborhood






































9Hence all neighborhood characteristics relevant to households are fully determined by the














































Figure 1: Neighborhood characteristics as functions of threshold white income z.
The manner in which neighborhood characteristics change as the threshold white income
varies between zmin and zmax is illustrated in Figure 1. When z = zmin, there is complete
residential segregation by race, with the second (all-white) neighborhood having higher mean
income. As z rises from this minimum value, the lowest income whites in the second neigh-
borhood are replaced by the highest income blacks from the ﬁrst, which leads to increasing
income disparities across neighborhoods. The point at which neighborhood income dispari-
ties are greatest occurs when z = z0, where ˜ yb(z0)=z0. This would be the outcome if sorting
were based on income alone.8 A tt h i sp o i n ti tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tt h el o w e r - t a i ln e i g h -
borhood has a greater proportion of black households than the upper-tail neighborhood. As
z rises beyond this point, overall stratiﬁcation by income begins to decline. At the point
8If the largest black income lies below the median white income and if the black share of the metropolitan
population is suﬃciently small, there may be no z ∈ [zmin,z max] such that ˜ yb(z)=z. In this case sorting by
income alone would give rise to a segregated allocation and the largest income diﬀerence between the two
neighborhoods would occur when z = zmin.
10z = z00 the two neighborhoods have the same racial composition. If β is suﬃciently large, at
some point the two neighborhoods will have identical mean incomes; this occurs at z = z000 in
the ﬁgure. Beyond this point the second (upper-tail) neighborhood has lower mean income
since it consists of all but the poorest segments of the less aﬄuent race together with a few
of the wealthiest members of the more aﬄuent race. Finally, when z = zmax, the allocation
is again segregated but with the most aﬄuent whites sharing a neighborhood with the city’s
black population, while lower income whites live in a racially homogenous neighborhood.
As noted above, any equilibrium in which the higher income neighborhood has a higher
rent must be intraracially stratiﬁed, and the focus in this paper will accordingly be on this
class of equilibria. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we note that there can be equi-
libria which are not intraracially stratiﬁed and in which there is no rent diﬀerential across
neighborhoods. For example, an allocation in which each neighborhood has the same mean
income and racial composition as the city as a whole must be an equilibrium in the absence of
ar e n td i ﬀerential, since all households regardless of race will be indiﬀerent between neighbor-
hoods. There can also be an equilibrium in which the two neighborhoods have equal rents,
all black households occupy the same neighborhood, and all white households are indiﬀerent
between the two neighborhoods. The diﬀerence in mean income across neighborhoods must
exactly compensate whites for diﬀerences in neighborhood racial composition. Note that
all such equilibria require that there be no rent diﬀerential across neighborhoods, and the
emergence of the slightest such diﬀerential will induce households to arrange themselves in a
manner that is intraracially stratiﬁed. We accordingly conﬁne our attention in the remainder
of this paper to intraracially stratiﬁed allocations and derive below the conditions for local
stability of this class of equilibria.
4S t a b i l i t y
At any intraracially stratiﬁed allocation z, deﬁne the marginal bid-rent ρw(z) as the maxi-
m u mr e n tt h a taw h i t eh o u s e h o l dw i t hi n c o m ez is willing to pay to live in the upper-tail
neighborhood. Similarly, deﬁne ρb(z) as the maximum rent that a black household with
income ˜ yb(z) is willing to pay to live in the upper-tail neighborhood. These functions are









b, ¯ y2(z),β2(z)) − U(˜ y
b(z), ¯ y1(z),β1(z)).
There will always exist ﬁnite pair of marginal bid rents which satisfy these indiﬀerence
conditions provided that u(c, ¯ y) shows enough variation in c. We assume that this is indeed
11the case. Furthermore, this pair of marginal bid-rents is uniquely determined since u(c, ¯ y) is
strictly increasing in its ﬁrst argument.
Any integrated allocation at which the two marginal bid-rents ρw(z) and ρb(z) coin-
cide and are positive is an equilibrium allocation with the equilibrium rent being equal to
the common marginal bid-rents. This is the case because the marginal households (with
income z and yb(z) respectively) are indiﬀerent between the two neighborhoods, while all
other households have a strict preference for the neighborhood to which they are allocated.
Moreover, all integrated equilibria must be such that the marginal bid-rents coincide and
are non-negative. At segregated equilibria the marginal bid-rents will generally diﬀer, but it
must be the case that all black households prefer the neighborhood in which they all reside.
Hence if all black households live in the lower-tail neighborhood, we must have ρw(z) ≥ ρb(z),
while the inequality is reversed if all black households live in the upper-tail neighborhood.
Intuitively, an equilibrium will be stable if small movements of individuals across neigh-
borhoods are self-correcting and hence restore the equilibrium allocation. More formally, for
all z ∈ (zmin,z max), consider the following speciﬁcation for disequilibrium dynamics
˙ z = H(ρ
b(z) − ρ
w(z)), (1)
where H is an arbitrary strictly increasing function which satisﬁes H(0) = 0. These dynamics
implicitly assume that when individuals relocate, they do so in a manner that maintains
intraracial stratiﬁcation: the marginal households are the ﬁrst to move. The dynamics at
boundary points z ∈ {zmin,z max} are slightly diﬀerent, since trajectories must remain within












if z = zmax
.
Any rest-point z∗ ∈ [zmin,z max] of these dynamics corresponds to an equilibrium. We shall
say that an equilibrium allocation z∗ is locally stable if it is a locally asymptotically stable
rest point of these dynamics.9 If an equilibrium is not stable, it is unstable. An equilibrium
allocation z∗ is stable if suﬃciently small perturbations of z away from z∗ in either direction
are self-correcting.
The following examples illustrates this notion of stability and shows how segregation can
be a stable equilibrium outcome even when preferences are quite strongly pro-integrationist.
Example 1 Suppose that the income distributions are uniform with support [0,0.7] for black
households and [0.3,1] for white households, u(c, ¯ y)=l o g c +¯ y, β =0 .45 and v(r)=
9The rest point z∗ ∈ [zmin,z max] is locally asymptotically stable if there exists an open set N containing
z∗ which has the property that all trajectories which originate at a point z ∈ N ∩[zmin,z max] converge to z∗.
12r(1 − r + η) with η =0 .15. Then there are two equilibria (z∗,ρ ∗):
z∗ ˜ yb(z∗) β1(z∗) β2(z∗) ¯ y1(z∗) ¯ y2(z∗) ρ∗
0.36 0.70 0.90 0.00 0.35 0.68 0.11
0.83 0.12 0.16 0.74 0.49 0.54 0.02
0
























































Figure 2. Marginal Bid Rent Curves: Stable Segregation
T h em a r g i n a lb i d - r e n tc u r v e sc o r r e s p o n d i n gt ot h ee x a m p l ea r ed e p i c t e di nF i g u r e2 .
There are two equilibria, the ﬁrst of which is segregated. At this equilibrium, the lower
income neighborhood is predominantly black while the higher income neighborhood is exclu-
sively white. Residential segregation is much higher than that which either group considers
ideal.10 This occurs despite the fact that preferences are very pro-integrationist and the two
income distributions have considerable overlap. The equilibrium is sustained by the fact that
the marginal white household, despite being of lower income than the most aﬄuent black
household, is willing to outbid the latter to live in the second neighborhood. This is because
10The ideal neighborhood racial composition for whites (blacks) in this example entails a neighborhood
that is 42.5% black (white). In equilibrium all black households and the lowest income white households live
in a neighborhood which is 10% white.
13the highest income black households, despite being able to comfortably aﬀord the higher
rents in the more aﬄuent neighborhood, are deterred by the fact that this neighborhood is
exclusively white. Similarly, the marginal white household is faced with a choice between
an exclusively white neighborhood and a predominantly black one. While neither of these is
options is particularly attractive, the former is considerably more appealing than the latter.
This causes even relatively low income white households to willingly pay the higher rent in
t h em o r ea ﬄuent neighborhood.
There is a second equilibrium in this example which is integrated and has the seemingly
paradoxical property that the higher income neighborhood consists predominantly of the
lower income group. This equilibrium is locally unstable. To see this, consider a small
decline in z, brought about by a shift of white households from the ﬁrst to the second
neighborhood, and a movement of black households in the opposite direction. As can be
seen from Figure 1, this raises the marginal bid rents of both blacks and whites, but the
white marginal bid rent rises by a greater amount. Hence at the perturbed allocation the
marginal white household will outbid the marginal black household to live in the second
neighborhood, leading to an inﬂow of whites into the second neighborhood, further reducing
z. Instead of being self-correcting, a small movement of whites to the second neighborhood
is self-amplifying, resulting in cumulative divergence away from the equilibrium.
The city in this example therefore exhibits a unique stable equilibrium in which the
marginal black household is more aﬄuent than the marginal white household (˜ yb(z) >z ).
Proposition 3 in the appendix identiﬁes suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a stable
equilibrium with this property. At any such equilibrium, the wealthiest households in the
lower income neighborhood will be black. In other words, there exists a range of incomes
lying between z and ˜ yb(z) such that households falling within this range will be in the poorer
neighborhood if and only if they are black. White and black households with the same
income will therefore experience systematically diﬀerent levels of neighborhood quality. In
the presence of human capital externalities, the income of this group of black households will
underpredict the future economic success of their children relative to the income of white
households, an eﬀect that could not occur under stratiﬁcation alone. This is a sobering
thought. Even in a world without overt discrimination, and one in which the desire for
integration is strong, the advantage of being born to aﬄuence may be magniﬁed if one is
also born to an aﬄuent “race”.11
11See Loury (1977) for a pioneering theoretical exploration of the possibility that residential segregation
may play a key role in the transmission of racial inequality across generations. These intergenerational eﬀects
are not explored in the present paper but clearly constitute an important extension.
145 Income Disparities and Segregation
We now turn to our main results on the relationship between income disparities and the
extent of segregation. We approach this question by allowing income distributions to depend
on a scaling parameter α ∈ [0,1]. Let Fb(y,α) and Fw(y,α) represent these distributions.
We assume that the distribution functions and their supports are continuous in α,a n dt h a t
higher values of α correspond to smaller racial income disparities. Speciﬁcally, Fb(y,α) is
nonincreasing in α and Fw(y,α) is nondecreasing in α.
The scaling parameter α represents racial income disparities, with α =0corresponding to





max(α)] are bounded and nondegenerate for all
α ∈ [0,1], overlapping for all α ∈ (0,1], and satisfy yb
max(0) = yw
min(0). At all income levels
y the distributions satisfy Fb(y,α) >F w(y,α) for all α ∈ [0,1) and Fb(y,1) = Fw(y,1).
This reﬂects the hypothesis that the black income distribution is dominated by the white
distribution at all levels of α ∈ [0,1), with convergence in distributions arising at α =1 .
Racial disparities in the distribution of income can be tracked by looking at changes in α.
We begin by considering conditions under which segregated allocations arise in stable
equilibrium. Consider the allocation z = zmin in which the upper-tail neighborhood is exclu-
sively white and the black population share in the lower-tail neighborhood is 2β. Since the
exclusively white neighborhood has the higher mean income, the marginal white household
will have a positive willingness-to-pay to live there provided that β is suﬃciently large.12 In
other words, if β is large enough, the marginal bid rent for whites ρw(zmin) at the segregated
allocation will be strictly positive. This allocation will constitute a stable equilibrium with
equilibrium rent ρw(zmin) if and only if ρb(zmin) <ρ w(zmin). Intuitively, this will occur when
the highest income black households are not too much more aﬄuent than the marginal white
households. That is, segregation will be stable if racial income distributions are suﬃciently
unequal. The following result states this formally, and also makes the less intuitive claim
that segregation will be stable if racial income distributions are suﬃciently equal.
Proposition 1 There exists ˆ β<1
2 with the following property: for any β>ˆ β there exist
αl > 0 and αh < 1 such that a stable segregated equilibrium exists for all α ∈ (0,α l)∪(αh,1).
Proposition 1 states that segregation will be stable in cities with signiﬁcant black popula-
tions provided that racial inco m ed i s p a r i t i e sa r ee i t h e rs u ﬃciently large or suﬃciently small.
12On the other hand, if β is small enough and preferences are suﬃciently pro-integrationist, higher income
whites will outbid poorer whites to live with the (relatively small) black population, so z = zmin will not be
an equilibrium allocation.
15Under these circumstances the lowest income whites will share the lower-tail neighborhood
with the black population and the higher income whites will live in an exclusively white
neighborhood. When racial income disparities are large, even allocations involving pure
stratiﬁcation by income are highly segregated, and preferences over neighborhood racial
composition reinforce and exacerbate this eﬀect. Hence the stability of complete segregation
in this case is not surprising. Less intuitive is the ﬁnding that segregated allocations are sta-
ble equilibria when racial income disparities are suﬃciently small. This occurs because, when
the two income distributions are virtually identical, complete segregation does not result in
substantial income disparities across neighborhoods. This in turn implies that the beneﬁtt o
the wealthiest black households from moving to higher income, predominantly white neigh-
borhoods is small. Even a slight preference for all-black over all-white neighborhoods can
overwhelm this eﬀect and lead to stable patterns of extreme segregation. Consequently, the
relationship between racial income disparities and the stability of segregated equilibria is not
monotonic: segregation may be inconsistent with intermediate values of α while it is consis-
tent with values of α lying at either extreme. Note that the result need not hold when β is
suﬃciently small. In other words, segregation will be stable as income distributions converge
in metropolitan areas with signiﬁcant black populations, but need not be stable in areas with
small black populations. This is broadly consistent with empirical realities. Speaking of the
decline in segregation during the 1980s, Farley and Frey (1994, p. 40) observe that “the
largest declines occurred in metropolitan areas in which blacks made up a small percentage
of the neighborhood of the typical white.” While this ﬁnding has commonly been attributed
to the hypothesis that whites are threatened by large numbers of black households in their
neighborhoods, our analysis suggest an alternative interpretation. When the share of black
households in a city is small, whites sort themselves more extensively by income. The dif-
ference in income between more aﬄuent white neighborhoods and black neighborhoods is
therefore greater, tempting the highest income black households to move to overwhelmingly
white neighborhoods. Thus segregation is less likely to remain stable in cities with small
black populations as racial income disparities decline.
Stability of complete segregation does not imply that integrated equilibria cannot also
be stable, as the following example illustrates:
Example 2 Suppose that the income distributions are uniform with support [0,0.9] for black
households and [0.1,1] for white households, with all other speciﬁcations as in Example 1.
16Then there exist four equilibria:
z∗ ˜ yb β1 β2 ¯ y1 ¯ y2 ρ
0.18 0.90 0.90 0.00 0.42 0.59 0.04
0.24 0.83 0.83 0.07 0.37 0.64 0.06
0.49 0.53 0.53 0.37 0.28 0.73 0.18
0.89 0.03 0.03 0.87 0.48 0.53 0.01
Of the four equilibria identiﬁed in the example, only the ﬁrst (involving segregation) and the
third (involving substantial integration) are stable. This can be seen in Figure 3, where the
marginal bid-rent functions are depicted. Both stable equilibria are of the kind identiﬁed
in Examples 1 and 2, with the marginal black household having higher income than the
marginal white household.
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Figure 3: Multiple Stable Equilibria
T h ea b o v ee x a m p l ei sr o b u s ti nt h a tw h e nr a c i a li n c o m ed i s p a r i t i e sa r es u ﬃciently small,
and preferences are suﬃciently pro-integrationist, a stable integrated equilibrium always
exists. To establish this, consider the following parametric form for preferences over neigh-
borhood racial composition:
v(r)=r(1 − r + η). (2)
17The parameter η ∈ [0,1] measures the degree to which residence with one’s own group
is desired. When η =0each individual’s ideal neighborhood racial composition consists
of equal shares of blacks and whites. More generally, the ideal racial composition for an
individual is to have a share 1
2 (1 + η) of her own type in the neighborhood. Larger values of
η therefore correspond to a greater bias towards one’s own group. Except in the extreme case
η =1 , such preferences are nonmonotonic: all individuals prefer some degree of integration to
complete segregation. For any value of η<1
2, the range of neighborhood compositions that
are strictly preferred to complete segregation includes allocations in which the individual is
in a minority. Note that Proposition 1 holds for any η>0.
The smaller the value of η, the more pro-integrationist preferences will be. The following
result establishes the existence of integrated equilibria when racial income disparities are
suﬃciently small and preferences are suﬃciently pro-integrationist.
Proposition 2 There exists ˆ α<1 with the following property: for any α>ˆ α, there exists
ˆ η>0 such that a stable integrated equilibrium exists for all η<ˆ η.
In combination with Proposition 1, one implication of this result is that multiple stable
equilibria exist when preferences over neighborhood racial composition are suﬃciently pro-
integrationist, racial disparities in the distribution of income are small, and the black share
of the metropolitan population is suﬃciently large. When α =1the integrated equilibrium
involves identical neighborhood racial compositions and complete stratiﬁcation by income.
In the limiting case when such disparities disappear, there is a stable equilibrium in which
there is eﬀectively no racial segregation in residential patterns.
Propositions 1-2 may be illustrated by looking at the special case in which black and
white income distributions are both uniform with supports [0, 1
2 (1 + α)] and [1
2 (1 − α),1]
respectively. The manner in which the set of stable equilibria varies with racial income
disparities α i ss h o w ni nF i g u r e4 . 13 When racial income disparities are extreme (α close to
zero) complete segregation is the only stable outcome. As racial income disparities narrow
there comes a point when the segregated equilibrium loses stability and the unique stable
e q u i l i b r i u mi n v o l v e ss o m ed e g r e eo fm i x i n g . B e y o n dt h i sp o i n t ,c o n v e r g e n c eo fi n c o m e s
13The ﬁgure is based on the following speciﬁcations of our parameters: β =0 .45,u (c, ¯ y)=l o gc +¯ y, and
η =0 .08. This value of η implies an ideal neighborhood racial composition entailing 54% of one’s own group,
which is roughly consistent with the survey evidence reported in Section 2. The value of β approximates the
share of black households in central cities such as Philadelphia, St. Louis and Cleveland. Each value of α
corresponds to a particular ratio of black to white mean household income. The critical values if this ratio
(corresponding to αl and αh)i nt h i se x a m p l ea r e48% and 75% respectively. There is substantial geographic
variation in this ratio across the nation, with most major cities with signiﬁcant black populations falling in
the 50%-80% range.
18goes hand in hand with greater integration. Eventually α crosses a threshold and multiple
equilibria arise, with complete segregation becoming stable. Further convergence of incomes
can lead to persistent segregation or to increasing integration: depending on which of the
equilibria is selected. When the two income distributions are identical (α =1 )the two stable
equilibria are at polar extremes: one segregated and the other perfectly integrated with the











































Figure 4: Racial Income Disparities and Equilibrium Segregation
The emergence of multiple equilibria as income distributions converge suggests that even
in the face of increasing racial equality, changes in segregation need not be monotonically
decreasing. A period of declining segregation can be followed by a process of resegregation
once a threshold level of racial equality is attained. Whether or not such resegregation
arises in practice is likely to depend on the pace at which racial income disparities narrow
relative to the speed of adjustments in residential choices. If declines in racial inequality
proceed suﬃciently slowly, one would expect residential patterns to be close to equilibrium
over time, and hence to follow a pattern of increasing integration. In the context of Figure
4, gradual declines in racial inequality will lead to a movement along the locus of integrated
equilibria. On the other hand, if declines in income inequality are suﬃciently rapid relative to
19adjustments in residential choice, it is entirely possible that resegregation can occur. Starting
from an integrated equilibrium a rapid decline in racial inequality can shift the economy into
the basin of attraction of a segregated equilibrium. Hence the pace at which racial income
disparities converge in a metropolitan area becomes a critical determinant of the steady state
level of segregation.
Another implication of Proposition 2 is that stable equilibria can exist which involve
higher levels of integration than any household, black or white, considers ideal. For example,
if η = β =1 /2, the ideal neighborhood for each household requires that it be in a 75%
majority. Yet if α =1 , a stable equilibrium exists in which there is complete stratiﬁcation
by income, and exactly half the households in each neighborhood are black. To see why this is
stable, suppose that random perturbations cause z to rise so that the second neighborhood
is now majority black. Based on preferences over neighborhood composition alone, the
marginal black household would outbid the marginal white household for housing in the
second neighborhood, leading to cumulative divergence from the equilibrium. But with z
exceeding 1
2, the marginal black household is less aﬄuent than the marginal white household.
Based on preferences for neighborhood mean income alone, the latter would outbid the former
for housing in the second neighborhood. The combined eﬀect of these two forces determines
whether integration is stable. If preferences over neighborhood racial composition are not
too strong, the latter eﬀect dominates and integration is stable.
The results in this section suggest that racial disparities in the distribution of income
play a subtle and important role in determining patterns of segregation. Even when prefer-
ences are strongly pro-integrationist and the ideal neighborhood for all individuals is close
to perfectly mixed, complete segregation can result if racial income disparities are negligible
or extreme. Multiple equilibria are inevitable when racial income disparities are small. The
existence of multiple equilibria suggests that although stable integration may become viable
as racial income disparities lessen, a city may remain trapped in the basin of attraction of
the segregated equilibrium due to historical patterns of segregation. This is where social pol-
icy may be most eﬀective: temporary incentives for segregation may give rise to permanent
eﬀects. Note, however, that a shift to an equilibrium with greater integration (and corre-
spondingly greater stratiﬁcation) lowers neighborhood quality in the poorest neighborhood,
which consists disproportionately of black households. The movement of upper-income black
households to more aﬄuent communities worsens the conditions for those left behind; a point
that has been emphasized by Wilson (1987).14
Finally, our results imply that one cannot expect a narrowing of racial income disparities
14While the eﬀects of greater integration are theoretically ambiguous, Cutler and Glaeser (1997) present
evidence supporting the claim that black households overall beneﬁt from declines in segregation.
20to lead inevitably to lower segregation. While the convergence of incomes might imply greater
integration at integrated equilibria, it may also cause segregated allocations to become stable.
From a cross-sectional perspective, cities with lower levels of racial inequality need not be the
least segregated. And from a historical perspective, the march towards greater integration
may be halted and reversed in some cities as racial inequality declines.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Given the nation’s long history of slavery and de jure segregation, race has a degree of salience
in American life that perhaps exceeds that of any other socially designated attribute. Signif-
icant legislative changes over the past half century have attempted to equalize the racial gap
in economic opportunity. Over these years a substantial black middle class has emerged and
racial income disparities have narrowed. The eﬀect of these changes on residential segrega-
tion has been geographically uneven and, in many major cities with large black populations,
marginal. This is in spite of greater racial tolerance in attitudes.
We have shown in this paper that when households care about both the aﬄuence and the
racial composition of their communities, their preferences are reﬂected in patterns of segre-
gation and stratiﬁcation in subtle and sometimes unexpected ways. Segregated allocations
can be stable when racial income disparities are either very great or very small, but unstable
in some intermediate range. And small income disparities can give rise to multiple equilibria,
with segregation and integration both being stable. Taken together, our results help account
for substantial cross-sectional variance in segregation levels, and the statistical insigniﬁcance
of reduced income disparities in accounting for changes in segregation over time.
Our analysis is abstract enough to permit alternative interpretations. Instead of race,
the dominant attribute governing location decisions might be linguistic preference, religious
aﬃliation, or any other observable trait. It is also not necessary to interpret neighborhoods
in a spatial sense: interaction in schools, clubs or other voluntary associations will be subject
to the same kind of dynamics. One could consider wealth rather than income disparities,
and owned rather than rented housing without substantive modiﬁcation to the model.
The most obvious signiﬁcant extension of this work would be to allow income distributions
to be endogenously determined in an intergenerational context. It has commonly been
argued that residential segregation inhibits the narrowing of racial income disparities over
time. Whether this is true when segregation and income are jointly determined is an open
question of considerable analytical and policy interest.
21Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . Consider the segregated allocation z = zmin.N o t et h a tβ1 (zmin)=
2β, β2 (zmin)=0 , ˜ yb(zmin)=yb
max and ¯ y1(zmin) < ¯ y2(zmin). The marginal bid-rents ρw(zmin)
and ρb(zmin) at this allocation are deﬁned by the unique solutions to:
u(zmin, ¯ y1(zmin)) + v(1 − 2β)=u(zmin − ρ
w, ¯ y2(zmin)) + v(1) (3)
u(y
b
max, ¯ y1(zmin)) + v(2β)=u(y
b
max − ρ
b, ¯ y2(zmin)) + v(0) (4)
Deﬁne ˜ β as the unique nonzero solution to v(1 − 2β)=v(1), so at any β ≥ ˜ β,w eh a v e
v(1 − 2β) ≤ v(1).S i n c e¯ y1(zmin) < ¯ y2(zmin), we must therefore have ρw(zmin) > 0. Consider
ﬁrst the case α =0 , which implies yb
max = yw
min <z min. In this case a white household with
income yb




max, ¯ y1(zmin)) + v(1 − 2β) >u (y
b
max − ρ
w(zmin), ¯ y2(zmin)) + v(1)
Note that v(0) − v(2β) < 0 <v(1) − v(1 − 2β) and therefore the above equation implies
u(y
b
max, ¯ y1(zmin)) + v(2β) >u (y
b
max − ρ
w(zmin), ¯ y2(zmin)) + v(0)
Comparing this with (4) immediately yields ρb(zmin) <ρ w(zmin). Hence the pair (zmin,ρ w(zmin))
is a stable equilibrium for all β ≥ ˜ β if α =0 . For any given β>˜ β deﬁne αl ∈ (0,1] as the
smallest value of α at which ρw(zmin)=ρb(zmin), and set αl =1if no such value exists. Note
that for all α<α l we have ρw(zmin) > 0 and, from the continuity of marginal bid rents in
α, also ρw(zmin) >ρ b(zmin). Hence for any β ≥ ˜ β , (zmin,ρ w(zmin)) is a stable equilibrium for
all α<α l.
To prove the latter part of the result, consider ﬁrst the case β = 1
2 and α =1 , which
together imply ¯ y1(zmin)=¯ y2(zmin). From (3—4) and the fact that v(0) − v(1) < 0 <
v(1)−v(0), the marginal bid rents must satisfy ρb(zmin) < 0 <ρ w(zmin).I fβ is reduced while
maintaining α =1 , then zmin and ¯ y2(zmin) both increase, ¯ y1(zmin) declines, and ˜ yb(zmin)=
yb
max remains the same. Let ˆ β denote the largest value of β such that β>˜ β and ρb(zmin)=
ρw(zmin), and set ˆ β = ˜ β if no such value exists. At any β>ˆ β,w eh a v eρw(zmin) > 0 and
ρw(zmin) >ρ b(zmin). Hence the pair (zmin,ρ w(zmin)) is a stable equilibrium for all β>ˆ β
when α =1 . For any given β>ˆ β deﬁne αh ∈ [0,1) as the highest value of α at which
ρw(zmin)=ρb(zmin), and set αh =0if no such value exists. Note that for all α>α h we have
ρw(zmin) > 0 and, from the continuity of marginal bid rents in α, also ρw(zmin) >ρ b(zmin).
Hence for any β ≥ ˆ β, (zmin,ρ w(zmin)) is a stable equilibrium for all α>α h.
22Proof of Proposition 2. At any allocation z the marginal bid rents ρw(z) and ρb(z) are
deﬁned implicitly by:
G
w(z,ρ) ≡ u(z,¯ y1)+v(1 − β1) − u(z − ρ, ¯ y2) − v(1 − β2)=0 (5)
G
b(z,ρ) ≡ u(˜ y
b, ¯ y1)+v(β1) − u(˜ y
b − ρ, ¯ y2) − v(β2)=0 (6)
where ˜ yb,β i, and ¯ yi are all diﬀerentiable functions of z. Both ∂Gw/∂ρ and ∂Gb/∂ρ are both
strictly positive for all (z,ρ), since u is strictly increasing in its ﬁrst argument. Applying the












Suppose ﬁrst that α =1and consider the pair (z∗,ρ ∗) where z∗ is deﬁned by ˜ yb(z∗)=z∗
and ρ∗ = ρw(z∗). Since α =1 , we have β1(z∗)=β2(z∗)=β. Furthermore, since ˜ yb(z∗)=z∗
and ¯ y2(z∗) > ¯ y1(z∗) we must have ρw(z∗)=ρb(z∗) > 0 so (z∗,ρ ∗) is an equilibrium. (This
equilibrium entails pure sorting by income). To ﬁnd conditions under which it is stable, note
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Note that d˜ yb/dz < 0 and dβ1/dz < 0 <d β 2/dz. This, together with the assumptions
u11 < 0 and u12 ≥ 0, implies that ∂Gw/∂z < ∂Gb/∂z when η is suﬃciently small. This
proves that a stable integrated equilibrium exists for α =1 . The result then follows from the
continuity of marginal bid-rent functions in α and η.
23Finally, we identify suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a stable equilibrium in which a
set of households experience lower neighborhood quality conditional on income if they are
black.
Proposition 3 Suppose v(r) >v (1 − r) for all r>1
2. If yb
max >z min and β is suﬃciently
large, there exists a stable equilibrium (z∗,ρ ∗) with the property that ˜ yb(z∗) >z ∗.
Proof. If yb
max >z min then there exists a unique ˆ z which satisﬁes ˜ yb(ˆ z)=ˆ z. (This allocation
involves pure sorting by income.) Note that ˜ yb(z) >zfor all z ∈ [zmin, ˆ z),a n df u r t h e r m o r e
that β1(z) >β 2(z) and ¯ y1(z) < ¯ y2(z) for all z ∈ [zmin, ˆ z].I fβ = 1
2 then β1 =1− β2 > 1
2 for
all z ∈ [zmin, ˆ z] so we have
v(β2) − v(β1) < 0 <v (1 − β2) − v(1 − β1)
Since v(r) is continuous, these inequalities hold also when β<1
2 but suﬃciently large.
The latter inequality, together with the fact that ¯ y1(z) < ¯ y2(z) for all z ∈ [zmin, ˆ z] implies
that ρw(z) > 0 for all z ∈ [zmin, ˆ z]. The former inequality, together with the fact that
˜ yb(ˆ z)=ˆ z implies that ρb(ˆ z) <ρ w(ˆ z). This leaves two possibilities: either ρb(z) <ρ w(z)
for all z ∈ (zmin, ˆ z), or there exists at least one z ∈ (zmin, ˆ z) such that ρb(z)=ρw(z) > 0.
In the former case (zmin,ρ w(zmin)) is a stable equilibrium with the required property. In
the latter case, let z∗ denote the largest z ∈ (zmin, ˆ z) such that ρb(z)=ρw(z), and set
ρ∗ = ρb(z∗)=ρw(z∗). Clearly (z∗,ρ ∗) as an equilibrium with the required property. To see
that this equilibrium is stable, note that there exists an open set N containing z∗ with the
property that ρw(z) − ρb(z) has the same sign as z − z∗ for all z ∈ N. This in turn implies
that the equilibrium is locally stable under the dynamics (1).
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